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Abstract 
Research shows that exposure to heat-related cues (e.g., warm temperatures, “fry” and “boil”) 
influences the belief that global warming exists and poses a serious threat to humans. Drawing 
on social-cognitive principles of concept accessibility and applicability, we hypothesized that 
these effects may depend on how the issue is framed, given that heat-related concepts are more 
compatible with “global warming” than “climate change.” Exploring this possibility, we asked 
campus passersby about their belief in global warming or climate change shortly after a real-life 
unseasonably cold weather event (i.e., snowfall during Spring) (Study 1). A controlled Web 
experiment posed the same questions after participants viewed photographs depicting either 
unseasonable or seasonable temperatures in their locale (Study 2). Results suggest that priming 
cold weather decreases belief in “global warming” but not “climate change” among likely 
climate skeptics (i.e., conservatives, the environmentally unconcerned). Implications for 
motivated reasoning and the climate debate are discussed. 
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Of accessibility and applicability: 
How heat-related cues affect belief in “global warming” versus “climate change” 
 In early February 2010, a major winter storm afflicted much of the southern and eastern 
United States, with parts of suburban Washington, D.C., receiving over two feet of snow in a 
matter of hours (Morello & Halsey, 2010). “Snowmaggedon” and other portmanteaus (e.g., 
“Snowpocalypse,” “Snowzilla”) were popularized in the media and the blogosphere as monikers 
for the event, which rekindled the United States’ partisan debate over global climate change. 
Republican Senator Jim DeMint tweeted during the event that the snow would continue until “Al 
Gore cries ‘uncle’,” referencing the former Vice President’s work to raise awareness about 
global warming and its consequences (Condon, 2010), while Comedy Central’s left-leaning The 
Daily Show with Jon Stewart mocked the political right for using a blizzard to promote doubt 
about the phenomenon’s existence. 
The media reaction to Snowmaggedon highlights two puzzles regarding global climate 
change beliefs. First, whether or not people believe that global climate change exists seems more 
of a social matter than a scientific one. While the science has become increasingly clear that 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, primarily from the burning of fossil fuels, are causing a 
host of potentially catastrophic climatic changes affecting humans, other animals species, and the 
health of the global ecosystem (Oreskes, 2004; Parmesan & Yohe, 2003; Solomon, Plattner, 
Knutti, & Friedlingstein, 2009; Thomas et al., 2004), many citizens continue to doubt the 
phenomenon’s existence. For instance, a recent survey from the Pew Research Center finds that 
26% of Americans believe there is no solid evidence that the “average temperature on earth has 
been getting warmer.” Importantly, this figure varies dramatically across political groups, with 
only 7% of liberal Democrats but 51% of conservative Republicans endorsing the “no solid 
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evidence” response (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (Pew), 2012), 
highlighting a partisan divide that has been reliable for over a decade (Krosnick, Holbrook, & 
Visser, 2000; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Second, people sometimes confuse weather with 
climate despite the fact that prevailing local weather conditions (e.g., day-to-day temperature 
fluctuations) are poor indicators of the existence or severity of global climate change (Bostrom, 
Morgan, Fischhoff, & Read, 1994; Read, Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, & Smuts, 1994). 
However, given that global climate change is difficult to perceive through their everyday 
personal experiences, citizens may nevertheless be swayed by superficially relevant (but poorly 
diagnostic) indicators, such as prevailing weather, that are highly accessible at the time of 
judgment (Akerlof, Maibach, Fitzgerald, Cedeno, & Neuman, 2013; Weber, 2010; Weber & 
Stern, 2011). Indeed, an emerging body of research suggests that citizens’ direct experiences 
related to temperature, including local weather events and other heat-related cues, can exert a 
strong influence on climate judgments despite their limited relevance. 
Direct experience: Accessibility of heat-related concepts 
 Whereas earlier research on the factors underlying citizens’ climate beliefs focused 
primarily on individual difference variables (e.g., political orientation, trust in science and the 
media; Corbett & Durfee, 2004; Krosnick et al., 2000), more recent work in the tradition of 
priming (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 2000) has 
tested whether fleeting cues associated with the concept “heat” might bolster beliefs and 
concerns about global climate change. In a sample of university students who participated at 
various points throughout the year, Joireman, Truelove, and Duell (2010) found a positive 
association between outdoor temperatures and belief in global warming, consistent with similar 
findings from the national survey context (Li, Johnson, & Zaval, 2011; Donner & McDaniels, 
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2013). Suggesting that the experience of warmth promotes increased belief independent of 
weather, Risen and Critcher (2011) found greater belief in global warming when students were 
questioned in a warm (27°C) versus cool (23°C) room. Moreover, work on embodied metaphors 
has revealed similar effects, such that participants assigned to taste “hot” cinnamon gum (vs. 
“cool” mint gum) reported greater belief in global warming and more willingness to take 
greenhouse gas reducing action (Lewandowski Jr., Ciarocco, & Gately, 2012). Although these 
findings would collectively appear to be rooted in the spreading activation of concepts (Collins 
& Loftus, 1975) semantically related to “heat,” thus rendering heat-related concepts highly 
accessible and consequently more likely to influence judgments in the moment, support for this 
account appears mixed.1 Evidence in favor comes from Joireman et al. (2010; Study 2) who 
found greater belief in global warming following subtle exposure to heat-related words 
embedded in a word search task (e.g., “fry,” “boil”). Using similar methods, however, Risen and 
Critcher (2011; Study 4) found no effect of semantic primes, which they interpreted as 
suggesting that heat-related bodily states (i.e., the physical experience of warmth) are responsible 
for these effects. This explanation, however, does not appear to account for the varied findings 
referenced above (e.g., respondents typically complete surveys indoors; “hot” cinnamon gum is 
unlikely to appreciably raise body temperature), which collectively appear to suggest that heat-
related input from multiple sensory modalities is capable of influencing beliefs about global 
warming in situ, presumably due to the resulting heightened cognitive accessibility of heat-
related concepts. 
Beyond accessibility: Applicability to common frames 
 The extant literature makes a compelling case that heat-related cues can heighten global 
warming beliefs and concerns in the moment. However, by exclusively asking participants about 
ACCESSIBILITY AND APPLICABILITY IN CLIMATE JUDGMENTS                  6 
“global warming,” this work has overlooked what is likely an important factor in these effects—
whether the issue is framed as “global warming” or as “climate change.” Although their 
technical meanings differ (i.e., global warming refers to increases in average global surface-level 
temperatures; in contrast, climate change encompasses myriad altered climatic patterns resulting 
from anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions) (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2012), 
these terms are frequently used interchangeably in public discourse, including in news stories 
and national surveys on global climate change (e.g., Program on International Policy Attitudes 
(PIPA) and Knowledge Networks, 2005; Voorhees, 2012). Although used synonymously, 
research suggests that the public perceives these terms quite differently. Notably (but perhaps not 
surprisingly), “global warming” has been shown to evoke stronger connotations related to rising 
temperatures than does “climate change” (Whitmarsh, 2009). Thus, given their strong 
compatibility with the connotations of “global warming” in particular, we expect that heat-
related primes will affect beliefs more strongly when the issue is framed in terms of global 
warming as opposed to climate change. 
 Supporting this prediction, a large literature in social cognition demonstrates that the 
influence of accessible concepts is constrained by their applicability to the judgment at hand. In a 
classic demonstration, Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) asked participants to form an 
impression of a target person described in an ambiguously reckless way (“…He had already 
climbed Mt. McKinley, shot the Colorado rapids in a kyack, driven in a demolition derby, and 
piloted a jet-powered boat—without knowing very much about boats…”) (p. 145) after being 
primed with positive or negative words that were highly applicable (e.g., adventurous, reckless) 
or not (obedient, disrespectful) to the person evaluation task. Highlighting the importance of 
concept applicability, results showed that the positive and negative primes influenced 
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impressions of the target only when they were compatible with knowledge furnished about the 
target (see also Srull & Wyer, 1979). In related work, Schwarz and Clore (1983) conducted a 
telephone survey examining the effect of mood on life satisfaction and found greater overall life 
satisfaction on sunny days than on rainy days—unless respondents’ attention was first directed to 
the incidental source (respondents were asked, “How’s the weather there?”). Presumably, 
directing people’s attention to the weather allowed them to attribute their mood to its true source 
and to realize weather’s limited relevance to the life satisfaction judgment. More broadly, these 
findings highlight a couple of general lessons from social cognition research. First, people 
typically experience thoughts and feelings that happen to be accessible at the time of judgment as 
being “about” the target of judgment unless there is reason to doubt their relevance (Higgins, 
1996). Second, how people use accessible information is as important as the information itself in 
predicting how priming will affect judgment and decision making (for as review, see Schwarz, 
Bless, Wanke, & Winkielman, 2003). 
 Whether or not accessible information is deemed applicable to the target may depend on 
how the target is framed. The interdisciplinary literature on framing effects (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007; Entman, 1993; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
highlights how small changes in the ways that issues are presented can significantly impact 
judgments, including public opinion about consequential policy issues. For instance, emphasis 
framing—which refers to how the wording of issues encourages audiences to adopt some 
mindsets over others (Druckman, 2001b)—is seen when a spending initiative on the poor garners 
less support when described as a tax as opposed to an opportunity for advancement (Iyengar, 
2010).  
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In light of the research summarized above, we suggest that “global warming” and 
“climate change” may represent emphasis frames that are capable of influencing important 
climate beliefs. Given the partisan nature of attitudes about global climate change in 
contemporary politics, however, we also expect that the influence of these frames will vary as a 
function of political variables that traditionally correlate with climate skepticism in the U.S. (e.g., 
liberalism–conservatism, environmental concern)—a prediction supported by the large literature 
on motivated biases in judgment and decision making. 
Motivated reasoning and climate framing 
 Decades of research in social cognition highlight how various types of judgments, from 
basic perceptual tasks to higher-order reasoning, are influenced by the needs and values of 
perceivers. In an early demonstration, Bruner and Goodman (1947) found that children of less 
wealthy families, in particular, tended to overestimate the size of coins but not of size-matched 
disks. Similar effects emerge when object desirability is experimentally induced—for example, 
thirsty participants (i.e., who were assigned to eat pretzels) judged a bottle of water to be more 
spatially proximal than did non-thirsty participants (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010; also Balcetis & 
Dunning, 2006). Beyond the valuation of objects, in general, people are far from the impartial 
information processors that normative models would predict; rather, they appear to be motivated 
by various factors to reach conclusions that paint the self in a favorable light (Kunda, 1990). 
Given that people derive their self-esteem in part from the meaningful groups to which they 
belong (Cialdini et al., 1976; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), it is perhaps not surprising that group 
affiliation can bias partisans to perceive the same stimulus differently and to draw inferences that 
protect and promote the interests of their in-group (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Vallone, Ross, & 
Lepper, 1985). 
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 The political domain, in particular, is one in which numerous studies have exposed the 
biasing effect of values and group membership on how information is processed and interpreted. 
Research suggests that a person’s political leanings (e.g., Democrat or Republican, liberal or 
conservative) are shaped early in life (Sulloway, 1995) and have a genetic basis (Benjamin et al., 
2012; Eaves & Eysenick, 1974) and that these preferences, once formed, can be remarkably 
stable over time (Jennings & Gregory, 1984; Newcomb, Koenig, Hacks, & Warwick, 1967) and 
shape information processing at multiple stages, from automatic affective responses evoked by 
politically relevant cues to more deliberative evaluations of the strength of political arguments 
(Lodge & Taber, 2005; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Recent research on information provision in 
science-related messages reveals similar effects, suggesting that perceivers’ political values play 
a larger role than facts in the audience’s response (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011). For instance, 
Hart and Nisbet (2012) report that the same message feature—depicting a victim of global 
climate change as socially distal (versus proximal)—caused Republicans but not Democrats to 
report less support for climate mitigation policy. Although mere exposure to messages about 
highly politicized issues may automatically activate perceivers’ pre-existing beliefs and related 
value structures (Mutz, 2006), the evidence that liberals and conservatives emphasize different 
values when forming judgments (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; 
Lakoff, 2002) would suggest that the way an issue is framed matters, too (Chong & Druckman, 
2007; Druckman, 2001a; Scheufele, 1999). For example, framing global climate change as an 
economic issue (say, as opposed to a public health issue) might encourage thinking about how 
climate mitigation could slow job creation and stifle economic growth, concerns that may 
resonate more strongly with political conservatives (Nisbet, 2010). 
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Recent data suggest that motivated reasoning may play a similar role when it comes to 
“global warming” versus “climate change” framing. In a national survey experiment, Schuldt, 
Konrath, and Schwarz (2011) found that Republicans (but not Democrats) reported significantly 
lower belief in global climate change when the issue was framed in terms of global warming as 
compared to climate change. Although the authors speculated that Republicans, as likely climate 
skeptics, might find it easier to discredit the phenomenon under a “global warming” frame—
given that routine temperature experiences (e.g., an unseasonably cold day) may seem sharply 
incompatible with the frame’s connotations of rising temperatures (Whitmarsh, 2009)—this 
hypothesis has not been tested directly. 
Drawing on theories of motivated reasoning, we aim to address this empirical gap by 
testing whether likely climate skeptics, in particular, report less belief in “global warming” than 
“climate change” after being reminded about unseasonably cold weather events. Thus, we expect 
political orientation to be an important and largely overlooked factor in the effect of heat primes 
on climate beliefs, such that groups that typically express doubt that global climate change exists, 
is caused by humans, and poses a serious threat (e.g., the environmentally unconcerned, 
conservatives, Republicans; Krosnick et al., 2000; McCright & Dunlap, 2000, 2011) will report 
less belief in “global warming” when reminded of cold weather. For their part, groups that are 
typically confident about the phenomenon’s existence and its human causes (e.g., the 
environmentally concerned, liberals, Democrats) may hold more crystallized beliefs that are 
generally less susceptible to priming and framing effects (e.g., Krosnick & Smith, 1994). 
The present work 
 Across two experimental studies, we test the prediction that priming unseasonably cold 
weather events will reduce belief in global climate change when it is framed as global warming 
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(vs. climate change), particularly among groups that are traditionally skeptical of the 
phenomenon’s existence (the environmentally unconcerned, conservatives). In Study 1, campus 
passersby reported their belief in global climate change framed as either “global warming” or 
“climate change” after recalling a recent, unseasonably cold weather event that occurred on 
campus. In Study 2, university students participated in a Web experiment that depicted either 
unseasonable or seasonable temperature events on campus (that were ostensibly being 
considered for a campus calendar), before completing similar measures.   
Study 1 
 As an initial test of the prediction that “global warming” framing will promote lower 
existence beliefs among likely climate skeptics when cold temperatures prevail, we took 
advantage of a real-life unseasonably cold weather event—namely, a heavy snowfall that 
blanketed the campus of a university in Upstate New York in late April, 2012—that was 
especially notable because it occurred on the heels of very mild temperatures and prompted 
much discussion and consternation among a campus community that was hungry for Spring 
(Bornfeld, 2012). Shortly thereafter (in early May), we conducted an intercept study with campus 
passersby to assess their belief in “global warming” versus “climate change” while the 
unseasonably cold weather was still fresh in memory. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-one passersby (41 females and 18 males; mean age = 21.05 years, SD 
= 1.99) were approached on a major pedestrian thoroughfare on campus (a plaza in front of the 
main student union) and were asked to complete a short “opinion survey.”  
Materials and procedure. Given the challenges of conducting an experiment in a busy 
outdoor setting (e.g., failure to attend to stimuli, difficulty administering sensitive manipulation 
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checks), we chose to employ a highly explicit weather cue in order to increase the likelihood that 
this information would be highly accessible when participants reported their existence belief. 
Specifically, the questionnaire displayed an image of a well-known campus landmark (a statue of 
the university’s founder) blanketed with snow. Directly beneath this image was the following 
text [alternative wording in brackets]:  
Remember that…campus recently experienced unseasonably cold weather and snowfall 
during April. With this in mind, we are interested in your opinion about global warming 
[climate change].  
Beneath this text was the key question assessing belief in global climate change worded 
in terms of “global warming” (n = 30) or “climate change” (n = 31) (consistent with the above 
wording), adapted from previous surveys on global climate change (ABC News, Stanford 
University, & Time, 2006) and used in previous research on climate framing (Schuldt et al., 
2011) (formatting original):  
You may have heard about the idea that the world’s temperature may have been 
going up [changing] over the past 100 years, a phenomenon sometimes called 
“global warming” [“climate change”]. What is your personal opinion regarding 
whether or not this has been happening? (Definitely has not been happening; 
Probably has not been happening; Unsure, but leaning toward it has not been 
happening; Not sure either way; Unsure, but leaning toward it has been 
happening; Probably has been happening; Definitely has been happening). 
Participants then reported standard demographics (e.g., age, sex). Importantly, because 
we expected these frames to exert more influence among likely climate skeptics, participants 
answered the following question near the end of the questionnaire as a brief measure of 
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environmental concern: “Generally speaking, how concerned are you about the state of natural 
environment?” (1 = Not at all concerned to 7 = Very concerned). Participants were then thanked 
for their time. On average, the questionnaire took less than five minutes to complete. 
Results 
To assess whether “global warming” versus “climate change” framing influences belief in 
global climate change following a real-life unseasonably cold weather event, we tested a 
regression model in which the belief variable (coded 1 to 7; 7 = Definitely has been happening) 
was regressed onto Frame (global warming vs. climate change; coded +.5 and –.5, respectively), 
Environmental Concern (mean-centered), and their interaction term. The analysis revealed a 
significant interaction (b = .73, t (57) = 2.57, p = .01) (see Table 1), which was diagnosed using 
techniques prescribed by Aiken and West (1991). This analysis revealed that participants low in 
environmental concern (operationalized as M – 1SD) reported significantly less belief under the 
global warming frame (M = 4.87) than under the climate change frame (M = 5.89) (b = –1.02, t 
(57) = –2.02, p < .05); in contrast, this effect was not observed among participants high in 
environmental concern (M + 1SD) (Mglobal warming  = 6.90 and Mclimate change  = 6.06; b = .84, t (57) 
= 1.65, p = .11). Complementing this spotlight analysis, simple slopes analysis suggested that 
this interaction was driven primarily by judgments about “global warming”: whereas 
environmental concern significantly predicted belief in the global warming condition (b = .80, p 
< .001), this relationship was not observed in the climate change condition (b = .07, ns) (Figure 
1). 
Discussion 
The present results are consistent with the notion that framing global climate change as 
global warming (vs. climate change) renders direct experience with prevailing temperatures more 
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applicable to judgments about the existence of this potentially catastrophic threat. Specifically, 
participants low in environmental concern reported less belief when the issue was framed in 
terms of global warming as opposed to climate change after being reminded about an 
unseasonably cold weather event in their location; in contrast, the beliefs of participants high in 
environmental concern were unaffected by this framing. This pattern may reflect motivated 
reasoning among a group that is traditionally skeptical of the phenomenon and its human causes 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2000) and who may be inclined to see disconfirming evidence in 
information that is highly accessible and applicable to a currently activated, frame-based schema. 
At the same time, this pattern may reflect more crystallized beliefs in global climate change 
among participants high in environmental concern, whose beliefs may be relatively robust to 
fleeting cues like weather and question wording. 
Although the present findings are consistent with the hypothesis that heat-related cues 
exert more impact on beliefs about “global warming” than “climate change,” the design of Study 
1 had some important limitations. First, all participants were reminded about the unseasonably 
cold weather event before reporting their belief; because our design did not include a neutral 
control condition, it is unclear whether the unseasonably cold weather prime caused the lower 
beliefs in “global warming” that we observed among the environmentally unconcerned. Second, 
the present study featured a one-item measure of environmental concern for its brevity given the 
nature of the study (a short intercept study with campus passersby). A validated scale measure of 
environmental concern would increase confidence in the reliability of the observed moderation 
effect. Third, the highly explicit nature of the prime may raise concerns regarding possible 
demand effects. Although we see a demand account as unlikely given that we observed a 
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moderation effect rather than a main effect, employing a less explicit cue would better align this 
work with past research on the role of heat-related cues in beliefs about global warming.  
Study 2 was designed to address these limitations. Specifically, we added a control 
condition in which participants were primed with seasonable temperatures, which allowed us to 
directly test the effect of priming unseasonably cold weather on beliefs. These cues were also 
less explicit: participants were exposed to the weather primes ostensibly as part of an unrelated 
task and were not specifically instructed to keep them in mind while completing the dependent 
variables. Finally, Study 2 featured a well-established scale measure of environmental concern 
(the New Ecological Paradigm; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000), which allowed for 
testing whether the interaction between environmental concern and framing condition observed 
in Study 1 would replicate with a previously validated measure of this construct. 
Study 2 
To more directly test whether heat-related cues will affect belief in global climate change 
particularly when it is framed as global warming (vs. climate change), we conducted a Web 
experiment in which participants viewed a set of photographs that served to prime either 
unseasonable or seasonable temperatures before they reported their belief in either “global 
warming” or “climate change.” In addition to priming unseasonably cold weather, we also 
included an unseasonably warm condition in order to test whether reminders of warm weather 
events would differentially influence beliefs under these frames. Although we held no firm 
predictions about the effect of warm weather reminders among likely climate skeptics, we 
tentatively expected warm weather reminders to heighten the “global warming” beliefs of likely 
climate believers, given that this “evidence” might readily bolster their pre-existing belief under 
this frame in particular. This was a cautious hypothesis, however, given that these participants 
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may be expected to hold highly crystallized, high-levels of belief about global climate change in 
the first place. 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and ninety-two students (147 females, 45 males; mean age = 
19.62 years, SD = 2.32) from the same university in Upstate New York were recruited via 
undergraduate lecture classes to participate in a Web based “opinion survey” in exchange for 
partial course credit.  
Materials and procedure. The study featured a 3 (Weather Prime: unseasonably cold, 
unseasonably warm, seasonable control) × 2 (Frame: global warming, climate change) between-
subjects factorial design. In the first part of the study (“Evaluating Photos for Campus 
Calendar”), participants were asked to carefully examine three photographs of outdoor spaces on 
campus, which were ostensibly being considered for a campus calendar. The instructions read: 
In this task, you will view some photographs of…campus that are being 
considered for a campus calendar and the month they were taken. Please 
look over the photos and the accompanying information carefully. Later 
on, you will be asked some questions about what you saw. 
 Directly beneath each photograph was a sentence, highlighted in yellow, stating the 
month in which it was taken (e.g., “This picture was taken during the month of April”). 
Regardless of condition, participants viewed the same three photographs, which were vertically 
arrayed on a single Web page and randomly ordered for each participant. The manipulation was 
administered by varying the purported month in which the photographs were taken, to make 
either unseasonably cold, unseasonably warm, or seasonable temperatures accessible (see Figure 
2 for an example). The three photographs depicted (1) a campus landmark covered in snow (i.e., 
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the statue of the university’s founder used in Study 1), (2) a sunny scene with students studying 
outdoors among leafless trees, and (3) autumn trees displaying colorful foliage. In the 
unseasonably cold condition, the snowy photo was purportedly taken in April, whereas the other 
photos were labeled with seasonally consistent months (i.e., the sunny scene was labeled 
“March” and the colorful foliage image was labeled “September”). In the unseasonably warm 
condition, the sunny scene photo was purportedly taken in December, whereas the other photos 
were labeled with seasonally consistent months (i.e., the snowy scene was labeled “January” and 
the colorful foliage image was labeled “September”). In the seasonable (control) condition, all 
photos were labeled with seasonally consistent months (i.e., the snowy photo was labeled 
“January,” the sunny scene was labeled “March,” and the colorful foliage image was labeled 
“September”).  
On the top of the next Web page, participants were presented with the following 
instructions: “Before we ask you about the images you just saw, we would like to learn a little 
about you. Please answer the following questions.” The main dependent variable—belief in 
global climate change, framed as either “global warming” or “climate change” as in Study 1—
was displayed directly beneath these instructions, followed by some additional questions related 
to global climate change not reported here. Participants next viewed a Web page displaying the 
same three photographs they recently viewed and were asked to indicate the month in which 
each was taken. This served as an instructional manipulation check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & 
Davidenko, 2009), allowing us to identify and exclude participants who did not pay sufficient 
attention to the materials, in order to reduce noise in the data. Following the manipulation check, 
participants were asked some additional questions probing their reactions to the photographs (to 
bolster the cover story) and then completed the 15-item New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale 
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(Dunlap et al., 2000) to measure individual differences in environmental concern (sample items 
include “We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support,” and “If 
things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe”). 
Participants then completed a personal background questionnaire that included demographics 
(e.g., age, sex), political ideology (1 = Very Liberal to 7 = Very Conservative), and the single-
item measure of environmental concern from Study 1, which allowed us to assess whether it was 
a reasonable proxy for the longer, validated measure (the NEP). Finally, we probed for 
awareness of the research hypothesis by asking participants what they thought the study was 
“really about” (none guessed correctly).  
Results 
Thirty-nine participants (about 22%) failed to identify the correct month in which at least 
one of the photographs was purportedly taken and were thus excluded from the analysis.2 The 
resulting working sample had 153 participants. This sample was predominately male (120 males, 
33 females) and tended to be politically liberal (M = 3.50, SD = 1.45) (52% identified as Very 
liberal, Liberal, or Leaning liberal; 21% as Moderate; and 26% as Leaning Conservative or 
Conservative). Mean age was 19.61 years (SD = 2.48). Importantly, the two environmental 
concern measures correlated significantly at r = .60 (p < .001). We report results based on both 
measures of environmental concern, as well as political orientation, below. 3 
Our main analysis took the form of a multiple regression model in which the main belief 
variable was regressed onto Weather Prime (unseasonably cold, unseasonably warm, seasonable; 
dummy-coded with seasonable as the referent group), Frame (global warming, climate change; 
coded +.5 and –.5, respectively), Environmental Concern (single-item measure, mean-centered), 
and all interaction terms. The model yielded a number of significant findings. First, the terms 
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representing the three-way interaction between Weather Prime, Frame, and Environmental 
Concern were significant (|b|s > .80, |t|s > 3.00, ps < .01) (see Table 2). In order to test the 
prediction that exposure to the unseasonably cold prime would reduce belief in “global 
warming” among participants low in environmental concern in particular, we conducted spotlight 
analyses to compare mean level belief in “global warming” following the cold weather versus 
seasonable weather primes at the M – 1SD and M + 1SD levels of environmental concern. This 
analysis revealed that viewing the unseasonably cold photographs led to significantly lower 
belief in “global warming” among participants low in environmental concern (Muneasonably cold = 
4.90 vs. Mseasonable = 5.82) (b = –.92, t (142) = –2.64, p < .01); in contrast, this effect was not 
observed among participants high in environmental concern (Muneasonably cold = 6.83 vs. Mseasonable 
= 6.23) (b = .60, t (142) = 1.71, p = .08) (Figure 3). Moreover, no effect of the unseasonably cold 
prime was observed for “climate change” beliefs, either among participants low in environmental 
concern (Muneasonably cold = 5.60 vs. Mseasonable = 5.15) (b = .45, t (142) = 1.35, p = .18) or high in 
environmental concern (Muneasonably cold = 6.70 vs. Mseasonable = 6.83) (b = –.13, t (142) = –.36, p 
= .72). Complementing this spotlight analysis and consistent with our main prediction, simple 
slopes analysis revealed a strong relationship between environmental concern and existence 
beliefs when participants were asked about “global warming” following exposure to the 
unseasonably cold prime in particular, b = .78, t (141) = 6.49, p < .001.4 
Turning to the unseasonably warm prime, spotlight analyses revealed—somewhat 
surprisingly—a similar effect to that observed in the cold prime condition.5 Compared to the 
seasonable prime, the unseasonably warm prime led to significantly lower belief in “global 
warming” among participants low in environmental concern (Muneasonably warm = 4.45 vs. Mseasonable 
= 5.82) (b = –1.37, t (142) = –3.08, p < .01) but higher belief among participants high in 
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environmental concern (Muneasonably warm = 7.28 vs. Mseasonable = 6.23) (b = 1.05, t (141) = 2.31, p 
< .05)6 (Figure 4). Moreover, no effect of the unseasonably warm prime was observed for 
“climate change” beliefs, either among participants low in environmental concern (Muneasonably 
warm = 5.59 vs. Mseasonable = 5.15) (b = .44, t (141) = 1.12, p = .27) or high in environmental 
concern (Muneasonably warm = 6.52 vs. Mseasonable = 6.83) (b = –.31, t < 1, ns). Although we did not 
expect this pattern to emerge for the unseasonably warm prime, we offer some possible 
explanations in the discussion. 
 We conducted a parallel set of analyses in which scores on the New Ecological Paradigm 
(NEP) were used in place of the single-item measure of environmental concern as the moderating 
variable. Results mirrored those reported above. First, the terms representing the three-way 
interaction between Weather Prime, Frame, and NEP were significant (|b|s > .12, |t|s > 2.00, ps 
< .05). Follow-up spotlight analyses again revealed that exposure to the unseasonably cold prime 
led to significantly lower belief in “global warming” among participants scoring low (M – 1SD) 
on the NEP scale (Muneasonably cold = 5.05 vs. Mseasonable = 6.18) (b = –1.13, t (141) = –2.89, p 
< .01); in contrast, this effect was not observed among high-NEP participants (M + 1SD) 
(Muneasonably cold = 6.64 vs. Mseasonable = 5.99) (b = .65, t (141) = 1.63 p = .11). Turning to the 
unseasonably warm prime condition, results revealed lower belief in “global warming” among 
low-NEP participants (Muneasonably warm = 4.87 vs. Mseasonable = 6.18) (b = –1.31, t (141) = –2.74, p 
< .01); however, no significant effect of the warm prime on “global warming” beliefs was 
observed among high-NEP participants (Muneasonably warm = 6.52 vs. Mseasonable = 5.99) (b = .53, t 
(141) = 1.16, p = .25). Lastly, no effects on “climate change” beliefs emerged for either the cold 
or warm primes, consistent with the analysis presented above. 
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Finally, because we expected that unseasonably cold primes would result in lower belief 
in “global warming” among climate skeptics more generally (not just those low in environmental 
concern), we examined whether political orientation (from 1 = Very Liberal to Very 
Conservative) moderated this framing effect in the predicted manner. First, political 
conservatism correlated negatively with both measures of environmental concern (rs  = –.35 and  
–. 39 for the single-item measure and the NEP, respectively; ps < .001), echoing a familiar 
observation in the literature (e.g., Dunlap, Xiao, & McCright, 2001; Jones & Dunlap, 2010). 
When we re-ran the above analyses substituting political orientation for the environmental 
concern measures, results revealed a similar pattern. The terms representing the three-way 
interaction between Weather Prime, Frame, and Political Ideology were again significant (|b|s > 
1.00, |t|s > 2.20, ps < .05). Subsequent spotlight analysis revealed that more politically 
conservative participants (operationalized as M + 1SD) reported lower belief in “global 
warming” in both the unseasonably cold (M = 5.19) and unseasonably warm (M = 4.55) 
conditions, relative to the seasonable condition (M = 5.92) (b = –.73, t (141) = –1.85, p = .07; 
and b = –1.37, t (141) = –2.38, p = .02, respectively). In contrast, the “global warming” beliefs of 
more politically liberal participants (M – 1SD) were unaffected by the weather primes, and no 
interaction was observed between weather prime and political ideology on “climate change” 
beliefs (ts < 1, ns). 
Discussion 
 The present results extend the observations from Study 1 in a number of important ways. 
First and most important, we replicated Study 1’s effect with a more comprehensive 
experimental design that included a control condition featuring reminders of seasonable weather 
(e.g., a snowy day in January). This allowed us to directly test the prediction that reminders of 
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unseasonably cold weather (e.g., a snowy day in April) would reduce belief in “global warming” 
but not “climate change” among likely climate skeptics in particular. Indeed, the present findings 
support this hypothesis. Relative to those primed with seasonable weather, participants low in 
environmental concern or high in political conservatism reported less belief in “global warming” 
when primed with unseasonably cold weather. In contrast, this effect did not emerge when global 
climate change was instead framed as “climate change.” Second, we found this effect while 
using more subtle weather cues than that employed in Study 1, in which participants were 
specifically instructed to think about a recent, unseasonably cold weather event while reporting 
their belief. In Study 2, rather, all participants viewed the same three photographs of their 
campus (with only the purported “month taken” labels manipulated, to imply unseasonable or 
seasonable weather), and did so as part of an ostensibly unrelated task (i.e., evaluating 
photographs for a campus calendar). Third, this effect emerged whether we used our brief, 
single-item measure of environmental concern from Study 1 or the more comprehensive and 
previously validated NEP scale (Dunlap et al., 2000), the two of which were found to be highly 
correlated. 
 We also found that priming unseasonably warm weather reduced belief in global 
warming among conservatives and those low in environmental concern. Although this finding 
was unexpected, we suggest that this too may reflect motivated reasoning among climate 
skeptics in a manner consistent with psychological reactance theories (e.g., J. W. Brehm, 1966; S. 
S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Dillard & Shen, 2005). For instance, such individuals may feel that 
their freedom to express an alternative viewpoint is constrained when they are confronted with a 
set of images in which the only unseasonable weather event depicted is a warm one (as opposed 
to a cold one), which may lead them to maintain their pre-existing views. Moreover, if local 
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warming is perceived as compelling evidence because it is highly compatible with the 
connotations of “global warming,” skeptical groups may be inclined to report especially low 
belief under this frame in particular, as a way to affirm their values and meaningful group 
identities (Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000). Among participants high in environmental concern 
(but, interestingly, not liberals), we found that priming unseasonably warm weather increased 
existence beliefs when the issue was framed as global warming. Presumably, this finding reflects 
motivated reasoning on the part of likely climate believers who may interpret unseasonably 
warm weather in their location as further evidence that the phenomenon exists, evidence that is 
more readily applicable under a “global warming” frame. 
General Discussion 
Although scientists have sounded the alarm about the threat of global climate change, the 
general public seems less concerned. In the United States, a majority of citizens now report 
believing that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are causing the planet to warm 
(Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Feinberg, & Howe, 2012). And yet, the issue remains 
highly politicized, with liberals and Democrats consistently reporting greater belief and concern 
than conservatives and Republicans (Krosnick et al., 2000; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Pew, 
2012). This gap between scientists and the public has inspired research on the factors that 
underlie climate opinions, ranging from general characteristics of the threat, such as its difficulty 
to detect through personal experience (Weber, 2010), to a host of individual differences variables, 
such as political ideology, environmental concern, and trust in science (e.g., Corbett & Durfee, 
2004; Krosnick, Holbrook, Lowe, & Visser, 2006). 
More recently, research in social psychology has begun to explore the role of variables 
that are more fleeting and temporary. In general, these findings suggest that subtle exposure to 
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heat-related cues (e.g., warm temperatures, words like fry and boil) can promote greater belief in 
global warming (Joireman et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011), suggesting that citizens’ climate beliefs 
are swayed by information that is highly accessible in mind at the time they are questioned, 
echoing a familiar observation from social cognition research (e.g., Higgins et al., 1977; Srull & 
Wyer, 1979; see Schwarz et al., 2003 for a review). A tacit assumption in the extant research on 
heat-related priming is that the observed effects derive from the cues themselves, overlooking the 
importance of the cue’s applicability to the phenomenon as it is currently framed (“global 
warming”). In this vein, results from the present experiments suggest that the influence of heat-
related cues on climate beliefs is constrained by how the phenomenon is framed in the question 
at hand, such that they influence beliefs when global climate change is referred to as “global 
warming” but not as “climate change.” 
In addition to highlighting the role of these common linguistic frames in everyday 
judgments about climate, the present work extends the literature in other important ways. In 
contrast to previous research, which has largely emphasized how direct experience with warming 
increases belief in global warming, we focused on the converse: how direct experience with 
cooling decreases belief. This focus was inspired by the observation that unseasonably cold 
weather events tend to re-ignite the debate over global climate change in the United States, 
which can readily be seen in the headlines of partisan media (e.g., “Gore to warn of ‘global 
warming’ on New York City’s coldest day in decades!”) (Drudge, 2004). This focus also 
highlights the likely role of individual difference variables such as environmental concern and 
political orientation in these effects, given their longstanding association with climate skepticism. 
Suggesting that these variables do indeed play a significant role, participants low in 
environmental concern (but not participants high in environmental concern) reported less belief 
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in “global warming” than in “climate change” after being reminded of a recent, unseasonable 
snowfall on their campus (Study 1). Moreover, conservatives (in addition to the environmentally 
unconcerned) reported less belief in “global warming” (but not “climate change”) after being 
exposed to photographs depicting unseasonably cold weather on campus, relative to those who 
viewed seasonable scenes; for their part, the environmentally concerned reported greater belief in 
“global warming” (but not “climate change”) after being exposed to unseasonably warm weather 
photographs. Overall, these results reiterate the tendency for people to confuse weather with 
climate (Bostrom et al., 1994; Read et al., 1994) and point to motivated reasoning on the part of 
climate partisans, who appear inclined to use normal temperature fluctuations as “evidence” that 
bolsters their pre-existing viewpoints when the active frame facilitates doing so. 
As such, this work also contributes to the large literature on motivated processes in the 
fields of social psychology and communication, which emphasizes how a perceiver’s needs and 
values shape basic perceptual processes (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 2010; Bruner & Goodman, 
1947) as well as higher-order reasoning (e.g., Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Ross & Anderson, 
1982; see Kunda, 1999 for a review). This includes recent work on how messages about the 
consequences of global climate change can lead to less support for climate mitigation policies 
among Republicans but greater support among Democrats (Hart & Nisbet, 2012), as well as 
research demonstrating similar “boomerang” effects in other domains, notably health, where 
well-intentioned interventions can sometimes increase unhealthy behaviors like smoking and 
alcohol consumption (e.g., Byrne & Hart, 2009; Grandpre, Alvaro, Burgoon, Miller, & Hall, 
2003; Wechsler, Lee, Nelson, & Kuo, 2002). Although our study did not feature a persuasive 
message per se, we suspect that a similar motivated process may explain why the unseasonably 
cold prime dramatically reduced belief in “global warming” among conservatives and those low 
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in environmental concern. Faced with evidence that seemingly contradicts a pre-existing belief—
especially one so imbued with social meaning and group identity (i.e., an identity marker; Hart & 
Nisbet, 2012; Kiely, Bechhofer, Stewart, & McCrone, 2001)—these participants may have taken 
a more extreme partisan position on this issue as a way to reaffirm their values, even in the 
absence of an explicit persuasive attempt (Mutz, 2006). 
This work is not without limitations. Both studies featured convenience samples of 
undergraduate students, a group that is not representative of the American public and may differ 
appreciably in their political engagement (Hillygus, 2005). Perhaps more important, the 
presumed mediating variable for these effects—the cognitive accessibility of heat-related 
concepts—went unmeasured in both studies. Future work should measure activation of this 
concept directly (e.g., using a word fragment completion task; Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982) 
to test whether such activation in fact mediates the moderation effects reported here. 
Additionally, we reiterate that this work was conducted in a broader political context, that of the 
United States, where global climate change is currently highly politicized. Given that climate 
politicization shifts over time (Krosnick et al., 2000; McCright & Dunlap, 2011) and across 
nations (e.g., Painter, 2010), the effects reported here are likely highly context-bound. 
Finally, we note that these results may carry important practical implications for public 
discourse about global climate change and science communication more broadly. Whereas other 
research has explored the effects of framing global climate change in different conceptual terms 
(e.g., as a public health threat; Maibach, Nisbet, Baldwin, Akerlof, & Diao, 2010), our data 
suggest that more subtle and mundane differences in message wording can produce meaningful 
effects on citizens’ judgments about climate. To the extent that “global warming” prevails over 
“climate change” as the dominant frame in national surveys (Leiserowitz et al., 2012; Pew, 2012) 
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and politics in general (as it may in the U.S. especially; Weingart, Engels, & Pansegrau, 2000), 
people’s day-to-day experiences related to heat might appreciably shift public opinion on climate. 
Our findings suggest that such haphazard influences may be diminished when the issue is framed 
in terms of climate change. Moreover, our results suggest that partisans may employ these 
frames strategically in order to encourage audiences to adopt specific policy preferences 
(Druckman, 2001b). Although there is some evidence that the use of these frames differs across 
partisans (Schuldt et al., 2011), further investigating the conditions under which these frames 
emerge in science and political communication is likely to be a fruitful avenue for future 
research. 
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Footnotes 
                                                
1 We use the term “accessible” here in the sense of being activated or primed, as distinguished 
from the speed or ease with which concepts are retrieved from memory (or “availability”; 
Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973). 
2 This proportion of excluded participants is in line with other work employing instructional 
manipulation checks (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Results do not change substantively when these 
participants are included in the analyses. 
3 The 15-item NEP scale showed good internal reliablility (α = .80) and exploratory factor 
analysis suggested the presence of a single dominant factor, in line with previous analyses of 
these scale items (for discussion, see page 435 in Dunlap et al., 2000). We therefore felt 
comfortable treating the NEP score as a unitary construct in our analyses. 
4 By comparison, this association was weaker in the “climate change” & unseasonably cold 
condition (b = .44, t (141) = 3.21, p < .01) and in the “climate change” & seasonable condition (b 
= .68, t (141) = 4.56, p < .001), and was not significant in the “global warming” & seasonable 
condition (b = .17, t (141) = 1.20, p = .23) (see Figure 3). 
5 A follow-up spolight analysis comparing the effects of the unseasonably warm and 
unseasonably cold prime on belief in “global warming” among participants low in environmental 
concern (i.e., M – 1SD) was not significant (b = -.451, t (141) = -1.12, p = .26). 
6 This test involves an extrapolated value (7.28) (the scale maximum was 7.00). 
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Table 1.  
OLS regression testing Frame and Environmental Concern as predictors of belief in global 
climate change in Study 1. 
 
             Belief 
Predictors b(SE) t 
Frame -.09 (.36) -.25 
Environmental Concern (centered) .43 (.14) 3.06** 
Frame × Environmental Concern .73 (.28) 2.57* 
% explained R2            24.5 
Notes. Frame coded as –0.5 = Climate change, + 0.5 = Global warming; *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 2.  
OLS regression testing Frame, Weather Prime, and Environmental Concern as predictors of 
belief in global climate change in Study 2. 
 
   Belief 
Predictors b(SE) t 
Frame .04 (.26) .14 
Cold Prime (versus Seasonable) –.00 (.18) –.01 
Warm Prime (versus Seasonable) –.05 (.19) –.23 
Environmental Concern (centered) (EC) .42 (.10) 4.15*** 
Frame × Cold Prime –.32 (.36) –.90 
Frame × Warm Prime –.23 (.39) –.59 
Frame × EC –.51 (.20) –2.51* 
Cold Prime × EC .19 (.14) 1.37 
Warm Prime × EC .34 (.18) 1.90 
Frame × Cold Prime × EC  .84 (.27) 3.09** 
Frame × Warm Prime × EC 1.28 (.36) 3.59*** 
% explained R2 43.7 
Notes. Frame coded as –0.5 = Climate change, +0.5 = Global warming; *p < .05, **p < .01, 
***p < .001 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Graph depicting the interaction between frame (“Global warming” vs. “Climate 
change”) and environmental concern (EC) in Study 1. 
Figure 2. One of the three outdoor campus images used as primes in Study 2 (unseasonably cold 
condition displayed). 
Figure 3. Graphs depicting the effect of cold weather prime by frame (“Global warming” vs. 
“Climate change”) and environmental concern (EC) in Study 2.  
Figure 4. Graphs depicting the effect of warm weather prime by frame (“Global warming” vs. 
“Climate change”) and environmental concern (EC) in Study 2.  
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2  
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
   
 
